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ABSTRACT
Background: It has been argued that the safety of
patients can be put at risk because the verbal
challenge—response protocols, frequently used by
healthcare professionals—can be compromised by the
system of work in use and the operational environment.
Individuals who constantly undertake verbal double-
checking safety protocols, when subjected to adverse
operational conditions such as high workloads, strict time
constraints and high levels of stress, can be captured by a
so-called ‘‘involuntary automaticity.’’
Conclusion: Evidence suggests that involuntary auto-
maticity could be used as a potential legal defence,
against an allegation of clinical negligence, where the
healthcare professional concerned had warned their
management that the conditions in which they worked
could promote the phenomenon, and no remedial actions
had been taken by them.
It has been argued by Toft and Mascie-Taylor that
the safety of patients can be put at risk because the
verbal challenge—response protocols, frequently
used by healthcare professionals—can be compro-
mised by the system of work in use and the
operational environment.1 In their paper it is
argued that individuals who constantly undertake
verbal double-checking safety protocols, when
subjected to adverse operational conditions such
as high workloads, strict time constraints and high
levels of stress, can be captured by a dysfunctional
sociopsychological error promoting phenomenon
they have labelled ‘‘involuntary automaticity.’’
Once captured by involuntary automaticity, it is
contended that while the individuals undertaking a
verbal double-checking safety protocol believe they
are concentrating on the task in hand, in reality,
only a superficial amount of attention is being paid
to the items in the list being checked. Thus, if an
error is present in the task being validated, there is
a significant risk it can be missed without the
individuals carrying out the safety protocol realis-
ing it. Clearly, where such a situation exists, there
is the potential for a patient to be harmed. A brief
overview of a serious patient safety incident where
it was argued that involuntary automaticity
adversely affected the staff can be found in the
box.
CONSCIOUS AUTOMATICITY
Automaticity arises in human behaviour when
skilled activities, such as driving, are practised
regularly. Instead of processing the information
one step at a time, such as when learning the
activity, the cognitive system automatically applies
the appropriate rules to the procedure, thus
reducing the demands made on working memory.
The spare cognitive capacity made available by this
process can then be used to process other tasks
simultaneously. At this point a person’s behaviour
can be characterised as having become ‘‘automa-
tised.’’ The person is however consciously aware
that the skill they are utilising is being controlled in
such a way.
INVOLUNTARY AUTOMATICITY
When discussing the concept of automaticity it is
usually the benefits that it brings, such as being
able to carry out tasks in parallel, which are
debated.2 Thus, it is has generally been thought to
be a highly desirable characteristic of human
cognition. However, there also appear to be costs
associated with people being able to enhance their
performance by such means.3 The potentially
dangerous nature of involuntary automaticity
arises because there are situations where the
cognitive system recognises the task being per-
formed, for example a verbal double-checking
safety protocol, and then automatically applies
the appropriate rules to that task.
However, on these occasions, Toft and Mascie-
Taylor argue that those affected do not realise that
such a process has been activated and therefore
may inadvertently miss an error which is present.
Consequently, it is possible for those who are
carrying out the check to form an erroneous, but
firm, belief that the system of work they are about
to embark on is safe when in fact it is not. This
occurs in part because ‘‘… they see what they
expect to see rather than what is actually
accomplished or indicated.’’4 Once established,
the flawed belief that has been generated due to
involuntary automaticity becomes the checker’s
‘‘reality,’’ and it is that mistaken conviction which
then influences their conscious and deliberate
actions. Therefore, although a verbal challenge-
response safety check has been carried out in full,
where involuntary automaticity has been induced
it may not be effective.5
The problem for healthcare professionals arises
because if they should miss an error due to
involuntary automaticity, and a patient is harmed,
then those involved could be the subject of
disciplinary or even criminal charges. This raises
the prospect that healthcare professionals could in
the future and may have in the past been unjustly
blamed or found guilty of causing a serious adverse
patient safety incident that was not as a result of
their negligence. This is because the systems
environment in which they worked actively
promoted involuntary automaticity, and it is to
that which they unconsciously succumbed.
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For example, Lisa Norris, aged 15 years was being treated
with radiotherapy for a brain tumour at Glasgow’s Beatson
Oncology Centre (BOC), Scotland in 2006. As a result of human
error, Lisa was inadvertently administered 19 consecutive
overdoses of radiotherapy. Following an investigation into the
circumstances surrounding her death, the official report
published by the Scottish Executive concluded:
… that most of the responsibility and hence any blame that can
be attributed to treatment planning staff at the BOC falls to the
staff member referred to in the report as Principal Planner A.6
Yet the report also came to the conclusion that:
… corporate failings were responsible for creating the conditions
under which the mistakes identified in this report were made and
that management at all levels must share the blame for these
failings.7
Thus, although it was explicitly recognised in the report that
the management of BOC allowed a situation to develop that
was ‘‘… not conducive to error-free working,’’ blame was still
attributed to the frontline staff involved in the incident,8 albeit
they appear to have had no option other than to do the best
they could under the prevailing circumstances.
It is perhaps interesting to note that the underlying
conditions described in the report appear to be similar to those
found to promote involuntary automaticity. When this
similarity was brought to the attention of the Scottish
Executive by the Medical Protection Society, they replied that:
‘‘The inspectors’ report avoids speculation on psychological
factors.’’9
Given that involuntary automaticity is a socio-psychological
phenomenon, induced by the environment in which healthcare
professionals work, such a standpoint by the Health and Safety
Regulator raises an ethical dilemma with regard to justice. For
example, if a group of healthcare professionals inform their
manager that their working conditions could promote involun-
tary automaticity, and the manager takes no remedial action
because the hazard to be avoided is a sociopsychological state
and not a physical one, what then? Should an error be
inadvertently missed by the healthcare professionals who
warned that involuntary automaticity could occur, and this
leads to a patient being seriously harmed, who is responsible:
the healthcare professionals who tried to prevent the adverse
incident from arising by informing their management that such
an adverse event could occur, their management for not
attempting to rectify the situation or both? The remainder of
this paper is dedicated to discussing this question.
POTENTIAL LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF INVOLUNTARY
AUTOMATICITY
Evidence suggests that involuntary automaticity is uncon-
sciously induced in healthcare professionals as a direct result
of their system of work and the operating environment.
However, it is the managers of healthcare professionals who
are directly responsible for the creation of the environment in
which healthcare professionals work. Thus, if the manager of a
healthcare professional is explicitly warned that the current
working environment could lead to their staff being uncon-
sciously captured by involuntary automaticity, and the manager
does not implement any remedial actions, then should an error
be missed, it could be argued that it is the manager of those
healthcare professionals who should be held accountable for the
incident and not the healthcare professionals who inadvertently
missed the error.
The logic underlying this argument is based upon the
principle of justice. It does not appear to be equitable for a
healthcare professional to be held legally or professionally
accountable for a patient safety incident (PSI) if it occurs under
the same or similar circumstances that they warned their
manager it might and where the manager took no remedial
action. Of course, the manager might argue that the predicted
sociopsychological phenomenon was not likely to occur and
that the healthcare professional concerned was being overly
cautious.
However, where a manager adopts such a position, and the
predicted consequence materialises, then the accountability for
its occurrence, we argue, should reside with the manager, and
not with the healthcare professional who missed the error. This
is because the manager, knowing all the facts and having the
authority to change the healthcare professional’s working
environment, has taken a conscious decision to accept the risk
of a PSI occurring, whereas, should an error be overlooked by
that healthcare professional, this would be an unconscious and
involuntary act. Hence, the manager is consciously taking a risk
which places the healthcare professional’s patients in harm’s
way by deliberately allowing their staff to work in an
environment where it is foreseeable that the operating condi-
tions could promote human error. Moreover, this line of
argument could be taken through to the Chief Executive of a
Trust and beyond.
This argument based upon justice stands the traditional way
of looking at allegations of clinical negligence on its head, for
instead of healthcare professionals who inadvertently cause an
injury to a patient being held accountable for a PSI, in the
circumstances discussed above it would be the ‘‘manager’’
of those healthcare professionals. As Mayles suggests, with
regard to the PSI suffered by Lisa Norris, it is:
… those who do not design systems to ensure that independent
checks are carried out who are to blame [for the incident] rather
than the unfortunate person who makes a mistake under
pressure.10
The concept of involuntary automaticity as a defence for an
individual has considerable consistency with established princi-
ples of English civil and criminal law, and, especially, profes-
sional ethical guidance. As already noted, a manager’s awareness
of a risk before an error is made is significant.
CIVIL LAW AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
An employer is vicariously liable for the torts (civil wrongs) of
his employee carried out in the course of his employment.11
Generally, the employee is not wholly insulated from liability,12
although usually in practice they will not be sued. The NHS has
borne tort liability for the clinical conduct of all of its employees
since 1990. In other areas of work, it is possible for the employee
to remain liable—for example, if the employer is insolvent.13
The concept of involuntary automaticity suggests that the
employee who has warned their management that there is a
significant potential for error due to the system of work in place
is not morally culpable, and that the fault lies with the
employer, who is then liable via a direct duty of care. This is in
keeping with the current arrangement in the NHS, in which
NHS bodies such as hospital trusts have primary liability to
patients.
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It seems that the key difference offered by a concept of
involuntary automaticity is to give greater protection to the
employee from liability. A successful clinical negligence claim
must of course satisfy the tests for professional negligence set in
Bolam and Bolitho.14 15 An individual professional defendant will
not be negligent if they have acted in accordance with a
responsible body of professional opinion (Bolam), subject to the
additional requirement of Bolitho that the opinion is capable of
withstanding logical analysis.
Therefore, a health professional who has acted in a reasonable
and rational way, intending to prevent an error occurring, is
unlikely to be found to be negligent using Bolam/Bolitho. A
person in a managerial role, who has received information about
a potential risk and failed to respond reasonably, may, however,
fail the Bolam/Bolitho test.
The importance attached to a managers’ awareness of a
potentially unsafe system of work is familiar to tort lawyers, as
it influences what is reasonably foreseeable.16
CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal liability classically requires actus reus (the ‘‘guilty act’’),
mens rea (the ‘‘guilty mind’’) and the absence of a defence. Mens
rea for more serious offences is usually intention or recklessness.
It follows that a defendant who did not intend the prohibited
outcome of his conduct, and did not perceive the risk of such an
outcome, like someone acting automatically, will not be liable
for such offences.
Many offences, however, do not require mens rea; these
include negligence-based offences. Criminal negligence is var-
iously defined. One definition is ‘‘… the inadvertent taking of
an unjustifiable risk.’’17 Allen notes that negligence is not really
a state of mens rea because it is inadvertent, although it is a type
of legal fault.18 Other definitions use the concept, familiar from
tort law, of falling below a reasonable standard of conduct.
Card, for example, states:
A defendant is negligent as to a consequence of an act or
omission on his part if:
The risk of it occurring would have been foreseen by a reasonable
person and
The defendant either fails to foresee the risk and to take steps to
avoid it or having foreseen it, fails to take steps to avoid it or
takes steps which fall below the standard of conduct which
would be expected of a reasonable person in the light of that
risk.19
It will be seen that because criminal negligence may be
inadvertent, liability may arise without mens rea. Involuntary
automaticity is therefore not itself a complete defence against
criminal negligence. Involuntary automaticity is not the same as
the rare criminal defence of automatism, which requires a total
loss of voluntary control caused by an external factor, and that
the defendant must not be at fault in losing capacity.20
However, involuntary automaticity, as evidence of an unsafe
system, might well influence a jury in a case of gross negligence
manslaughter, and could conceivably reduce the likelihood of a
prosecution being brought.
The leading case in gross negligence manslaughter is
Adomako.21 The defendant, whose conviction was upheld, was
an anaesthetist whose patient died after he had failed to notice
interruption of the oxygen supply. There were some adverse
situational factors. Dr Adomako had taken over the procedure
from another anaesthetist, he had had very little sleep after
being on call at another hospital, and he did not have the
assistant he was supposed to have. In such circumstances if, as
seems likely, such factors increase the risk of error, there is a case
for making the employers liable.
Following the cases of Adomako and Misra, a conviction for
gross negligence manslaughter requires the existence of a duty
of care, breach of that duty resulting in death and a risk of death
which would be obvious to a reasonable prudent person.22
Additionally, and importantly, the defendant’s conduct must
have fallen so far below the standard of a reasonable
practitioner as to be grossly negligent in the view of the jury,
and thereby warranting a criminal conviction for manslaughter.
It will be noted that the existence of a prior warning from the
defendant (or anyone else) about a potentially unsafe system of
work, such as involuntary automaticity, might be powerful
evidence which could influence a jury towards a decision to
acquit the individual defendant, although his own conduct will
remain highly relevant.
Generally in the criminal law, an employer does not have
vicarious liability for the criminal conduct of an employee.
However, a corporate body may itself be liable for crime. At
common law, for a corporate body to be criminally liable, it is
necessary to identify a ‘‘controlling mind’’ among the directors,
an individual whose own conduct makes them liable person-
ally.23 This ‘‘identification principle’’ means that generally, only
small companies have been convicted. The Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 came into force
on 6 April 2008 and should make prosecutions of corporate
bodies for manslaughter more easy.24 It will apply to the NHS.
The act retains the requirement of death caused by gross breach
of duty of care. Section 1(3) provides that:
An organisation is guilty of an offence under this section only if
the way in which its activities are managed or organised by its
senior management is a substantial element in the breach …
Under section 8 of this Act, the jury may consider evidence
that there were ‘‘attitudes, policies, systems or accepted
practices within the organisation’’ which are likely to have
encouraged failure to comply with health and safety legislation
relevant to the breach of duty of care, or to have produced
tolerance of it. This might include failure to address a system of
work thought to have been unsafe, including systems giving rise
to involuntary automaticity.
Other criminal sanctions may be applied to employers. In
Misra, two junior doctors were convicted of gross negligence
manslaughter after a patient died of a postoperative infection
which they failed to diagnose. Additionally, Southampton
University Hospital NHS Trust in the UK where they were
employed was successfully prosecuted under section 3(1) of the
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. This provides:
General duties of employers and self-employed to persons other
than their employees
(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his
undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably
practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be
affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health
or safety.
The Trust was fined £100 000 (reduced to £40 000 on
appeal).25 The initial charge had included allegations of failing
to take up a reference for one of the doctors, failing to
implement a system of ward rounds, failing to have proper
hand-over meetings for staff in the department and not having a
policy of encouraging nursing staff to report concerns about
patients. Ultimately the Trust pleaded guilty to an amended
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charge that concentrated only on the inadequate supervision of
the doctors in the trauma and orthopaedic department.26
A key feature of the Southampton case was that criticisms of
the management of the junior orthopaedic doctors had been
made by a nurse specialist in the department and by the
Commission for Health Improvement, although it is not clear
from the reported chronology in the law report that these were
received before the death of the patient. While this episode is
not one in which involuntary automaticity is an issue, it does
illustrate an unsafe system of work about which warnings
existed, and it is a disaster following which individual
defendants were convicted, even though serious management
failures were identified.
However, if a healthcare professional were to argue that
involuntary automaticity was the cause of the PSI in which
they were involved, an employer might find it far more difficult
to defend a prosecution under the Health and Safety at Work Act
1974 and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act
2007 if warnings had earlier been given concerning systems of
work where the risk of such an error being made had been
identified. In such circumstances, the relative punishments
administered to individuals and their managers by the Courts
could be a reversal of those noted earlier in Adomako and Misra.
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE
Medical professional guidance from the General Medical
Council (GMC) is clear about the duty to warn of potentially
unsafe systems. This is because a doctor may be personally
liable for mistakes made in clinical practice, and may have a
duty to report any perceived potential for error arising from
systems in which they work. It may also be that doctors in
management roles may be accountable to the GMC for
inadequate response when such issues are raised.27
In Good Medical Practice, the GMC includes a requirement of
doctors to rectify, if possible, systems which may seriously
compromise patient safety. If this is not possible, they should
notify the matter to the employer or contracting body.28
In Management for Doctors, the GMC states that a doctor in a
managerial role has a duty of care for the safety and well-being
of patients, and retains accountability to the GMC.29
The GMC also stipulates that doctors in managerial roles
should do their best to ensure that:
… significant risks to patients, staff and the health of the wider
community are identified, assessed and addressed to minimise
risk, and that they are reported in line with local and national
procedures.30
Recognition of involuntary automaticity as an unsafe system
of work suggests that doctors have a professional duty to
address and rectify it. Demonstrable compliance with this
professional guidance should protect against disciplinary sanc-
tions. It should also be highly persuasive in favour of individuals
who are defendants in civil and criminal litigation.
DISCLOSURE AND LITIGATION
For a prior warning of a potentially unsafe system to operate as
a defence for an individual defendant, it must be known to
exist. Usually the defendant seeking to use it will know of it,
but this may not be so. The duty of disclosure on parties to
litigation is well established,31 but apparent failure to comply
has featured in notable miscarriages of justice (a notable
example being R v Clark32) and may itself lead to professional
disciplinary proceedings and other investigations (see, for
example, Gooderham33). It follows that the recipient of any
warning of an unsafe system, and parties to litigation who
receive evidence that a warning was made, must understand
their duty to disclose it.
CONCLUSIONS
There is evidence to suggest that involuntary automaticity is an
error-forcing phenomenon with great relevance to incidents in
healthcare. Hence, where a warning is given that the environ-
ment in which healthcare professionals work could promote
involuntary automaticity, it is likely to heighten the legal and
professional liability of those in managerial roles. Moreover,it
presents the opportunity for a healthcare professional who is
prosecuted, and their lawyers, to place important evidence in
their defence before the court.
In essence, the evidence suggests that involuntary automati-
city could be used as a potential legal defence, against an
allegation of clinical negligence, where the healthcare profes-
sional concerned had warned their management that the
conditions in which they worked could promote the phenom-
enon, and no remedial actions had been taken by them.
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